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The once-heated division between liberals and postliberals may not be the great divide in twentieth 
century theology – it seems difficult to fit several important movements and debates into that 
schema – but it did loom large in late twentieth century Anglo-American theology. Knight does not 
propose to resolve away but to clarify the substantive methodological differences between them by 
exposing and correcting the theories of language with which they became entangled.  
He does so through close engagement with the theologies of Schubert Ogden and Hans Frei in 
particular. Ogden and Frei are plausible representatives of these approaches to theology and their 
respective commitments to the validation of Christian truth claims by public criteria and to the 
priority and particularity of God’s self-revelation in Jesus Christ. On Knight’s account they also 
exemplify how appropriations of deficient philosophies of language can complicate theological 
debate. 
The origins of their entanglements with linguistic philosophy, Knight argues, lies in the mid-century 
falsification debates in philosophical theology. To these he turns in chapter two after the helpful 
overview of the Protestant liberal theological tradition of the nineteenth century that takes up the 
first chapter. He traces the philosophical background assumed by most participants in that debate, 
the descriptivism which derived from Bertrand Russell’s account of how names refer to objects in 
the world. Following Russell, descriptivists held that a name refers insofar as it stands for one or 
more definite descriptions which, alone or together, uniquely describe the object to which it refers. 
The description thus provides the meaning of the term and the conditions needed to determine 
whether it refers. It is, Knight points out, a short step from this account of language to Anthony 
Flew’s contention that assertions which are not falsifiable – that is, they do not offer definite 
descriptions which pick out a unique referent which either exists or does not exist – are meaningless. 
Assertions of God’s existence end up in this category, Flew argued, for in the end those who make 
them allow nothing to count against them; they fail to offer truth conditions for theistic claims. 
Knight takes Schubert Ogden to be one of the more successful liberal responses to this challenge, 
which are examined in chapter three. Ogden accepted the descriptivist account of language but 
expanded the range of relevant experiences which might falsify a sentence to include non-sensory 
experiences, such as the experience of the self. Christian talk of God, as the transcendental ground 
of all experiences, is falsifiable in just this way, he claimed. In chapter 4, Knight shows how Ogden 
built on this approach. In Ogden’s method, theological claims which conform to a historical-critical 
reconstruction of the original apostolic witness to Jesus Christ are interpreted as answering 
questions of the ultimate meaning of reality for human beings, and then evaluated in terms of their 
credibility as answers to those questions. A descriptive sense of ‘God’ provided both the key to 
demythologising the apostolic kerygma and the content of falsifiable theological and existential 
claims.  
Knight takes Frei to inherit from Karl Barth not only the prioritising of ontology over epistemology 
and the subordination of theological method to the doctrine of God, but also a fear of Feuerbach’s 
critique of theology as anthropocentric projection (chapter five). Frei detected this 
anthropocentrism in contemporary liberal theology, where it was closely connected to descriptivism. 
Frei’s rejection of liberal theological method therefore required the rejection of descriptivism, Knight 
argues in chapter six. To this end Frei (and George Lindbeck) drew on the critique of descriptivism in 
the later Wittgenstein and Gilbert Ryle and increasingly had recourse to their accounts of language 
as the only available alternative. Knight’s reading of Frei rests largely on the latter’s critique of the 
liberal conflation of meaning with reference in The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, which (in chapter 
seven) he takes as an attack on descriptivism shaped largely by the influence of Wittgenstein and 
Ryle, alongside Barth and Auerbach.  
This attack on descriptivism, Knight claims in chapter eight, provides the continuity between Frei’s 
early and later writings. In those later writings, he argues, Frei’s reliance on Wittgenstein became 
more overt and thoroughgoing as evidenced by Frei’s shift in emphasis from seeing the meaning of 
biblical narratives as constituted by the narrative itself to seeing it as constituted by its use in 
Christian community. In the end, Knight claims here and in chapter nine, this reliance on 
Wittgenstein led to Frei from correctly denying that meaning can be reduced to truth conditions to 
denying any real relationship between meaning and reference, which made it difficult for him to 
make any sense of his insistence that reference does matter when it comes to the Gospel narratives, 
with the result that the insistence becomes no more than an appeal to faith. 
Frei was right to find descriptivism problematic, however. In chapter nine, Knight rehearses several 
serious critiques of that theory in the truth-conditional form it takes in Donald Davidson. Most 
pertinently, it proves impossible to derive the meaning of a sentence with any warranted confidence 
from the identification of its truth conditions. At the same time, however, Frei, with Wittgenstein, 
overstates the case in ascribing all constitution of meaning to communal convention. The use of 
referring singular expressions also plays a part in the meaning of many sentences and only by on this 
account this can we interpret the meaning of certain sentences, and distinguish the illocutionary 
force of fiction from factual claim, as Frei needs to but has no means to do.  
What is needed, Knight maintains, to correct both accounts of language, is to recognise: (with John 
Searle) that types of sentence may bear many meanings, but this semantic polysemy is put to use to 
produce a more determinate speaker meaning in actual sentences; (with William Alston) that the 
speaker meaning of a sentence, together with contextual factors, determines the truth conditions of 
a particular assertion, yet single referring expressions play a role too; and that the reference of such 
expressions may be determined descriptively or directly (as Saul Kripke argued). Such an account 
allows for greater diversity in theological method than liberals like Ogden would accommodate by 
allowing for direct reference to God as experienced in individual or communal experience alongside 
descriptive reference to transcendental experiences. This move in turn makes room for preserving 
the particularity of the meaning and reference Frei is concerned with. It also enables us to frame 
divergent liberal and postliberal readings of the resurrection narratives, for example, as different 
speaker uses of the semantic range of the text, opposed on properly theological, not linguistic-
philosophical, grounds. Finally, it removes any need to mystify the character of reference in 
theological language, as Knight holds Frei does. 
I have reservations about Knight’s reading of Frei on several counts. Knight is good on Frei’s 
metholodogical debts to Barth and indicates correctly ways in which Frei followed and sought to 
correct Barth’s method in his own work. Frei’s argument in Eclipse, however, is at once more 
focused than an attack on a whole theory of language and identifies a conflation of meaning and 
reference in respect of a particular genre that is broader than Russellian descriptivism in character. 
Despite acknowledgements to the contrary, the need to frame Frei as a counter-part to Ogden 
seems to lead Knight to attribute to the former a more general theory of meaning than he ever 
espouses and hence to exaggerate the influence of Wittgenstein upon Frei. For example, while it is 
plausible to think Wittgenstein informed Frei’s scepticism about general theories, Frei had prior, 
theological reasons for resisting their application to the gospels, which he articulated consistently 
throughout his career. Wittgenstein likewise provided warrant for close attention to Christian 
practices and how meaning and understanding function there, but did not supply Frei with their 
content. Indeed, Frei’s account of literal reading is also more complex and nuanced than Knight 
allows, being a communal consensus about a minimum rule that Jesus Christ is the ascriptive subject 
of the gospel narratives: a consensus which binds readers to the gospels’ narrative structures and 
which allows for considerable disagreement and diversity, including the pursuit of the historical 
Jesus, even in his more liberal guises. Closer attention to the way Frei reads the synoptic gospels 
would also problematize Knight’s account, for in practice Frei takes their narrative structure 
cumulatively to provide truth conditions to determine on what grounds Christian talk of Christ’s 
presence refers. This reading would likewise illumine Frei’s tortuous explications of how Scripture 
refers to Jesus Christ, the incarnate Word, where the meaning of Christ’s complex divine-human 
identity as the clue to the manner of his presence is also the clue to how such reference is possible. 
The attendant mysteriousness is hence properly theological, not Wittgensteinian, for God is radically 
unlike all other referents. 
These caveats notwithstanding, Knight’s is a bold and attractive proposal, supported by detailed 
exposition of demanding authors with impressive clarity and whose constructive elements seem 
appropriate and illumining. Frei, for example, can be read as reaching for but failing to frame clearly 
some of the moves and categories Knight advances. Perhaps the biggest issue Knight’s positive 
suggestions raise relates to the role ascribed to reference in determining meaning. Knight seems to 
link this role (p. 287) to the rational adjudication of the validity of theological claims, presumably 
against public criteria. But by whose rationality would they be adjudicated, and what degree of 
overlap or (ad hoc?) correlation between Christian and other discourses would be necessary to 
articulate acceptably public criteria to be articulated? Answers to such questions lie outwith the 
scope of the book but give further reason to look forward to future developments of Knight’s 
constructive agenda.   
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